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INTRODUCTION

Whether Justice Scalia chopped down the “judicial oak which
ha[d] grown from little more than a legislative acorn”1 or cleared an
entire forest of “botanically distinct tree[s]”2 when he created the
transactional test in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd., he
undoubtedly changed the legal landscape for both international and
antifraud securities laws. The transactional test—which the Supreme
Court designed to act as a bright-line rule to supplant the older
“conduct” and “effects” tests developed by the Second Circuit—
gauges whether a U.S. court can hear an antifraud securities case
containing extraterritorial elements.3 In clearing away decades of
federal extraterritorial jurisprudence, Morrison dictates that an
American court may no longer hear an antifraud securities case under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange
Act”)4 and Rule 10b-55 unless the purchase or sale of securities
occurred within the United States.6
Since its creation, the transactional test has gained both positive
and negative attention from the international legal community.7 But
after the hundreds of securities class action cases adjudicated since
the day of the decision,8 the question remains: Does the transactional
test clarify when an international securities antifraud claim falls
within U.S. jurisdiction?

1. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2889 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
737 (1975)).
2. Id. at 2880 n.4.
3. See id. at 2877–84 (explaining the history behind the “conducts” and “effects”
tests and concluding that Section 10(b) only applies to “transactions in securities listed
on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities”).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
6. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
7. Compare Andreas Tilp et al., AGORA – Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
35 DAJV NEWSLET. 116, 119 (2010) (Ger.) (“Foreign companies who had been subject
to actions for damages for having violated securities laws heaved a great sigh of
relief.”), with David Greene, The US Ruling on Morrison v NAB Deals a Blow to the
International Claims Culture, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2010, 11:05 EDT),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/jun/28/supreme-court-morrison-nationalaustralia-bank/print (“[T]he supreme court [sic] decision is a major step back for UK
investors.”).
8. See Luke Green, Morrison v. National Australia Bank - The Dawn of a New
Age?, ISS (June 25, 2010, 5:54 PM), http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2010/06/
morrison-v-national-australia-bank---the-dawn-of-a-new-age.html (noting that over a
thousand class action securities cases were pending following the decision).
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This Article will show that while Justice Scalia may have cut down
the occasionally thorny “conduct” and “effects” tests, the seeds he
planted with the transactional test may be just as difficult to care for
and administer. Courts must now grapple with defining the
“purchase” and “sale” of a securities transaction, and then determine
whether such actions occurred within the United States. Within a
complex global marketplace experiencing frequent cross-border
activity, such terms are not easily defined and lead to contrary
holdings on similar fact patterns.
Part I of this Article looks at how courts were able to avoid the
terms “purchase” and “sale” prior to Morrison. Part II examines how
Morrison used those terms in its decision. Part III analyzes how
courts have thus far interpreted the Morrison transactional test and
breaks down the various methods used in reaching their decisions.
Finally, Part IV suggests a method for unifying the disparate
methods of identifying whether a securities transaction is domestic or
not.
I.

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF “PURCHASE” OR “SALE”
LANGUAGE PRIOR TO MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK,
LTD.

Although courts prior to the Morrison decision agreed that there
should be an extraterritorial reach for antifraud provisions, there was
little consensus as to how it should be applied.9 Most private parties
rely on Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 to bring a
transnational securities fraud case within the United States.10 The
9. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880 (“Although the circuits . . . seem to agree that
there are some transnational situations to which the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws are applicable, agreement appears to end at that point.” (quoting
Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1998))); see Hannah L.
Buxbaum, Remedies for Foreign Investors Under U.S. Federal Securities, 75 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 161 (2012) (explaining that while public enforcement of
securities law has become more efficient over the years due to improved cooperation
between regulators worldwide, private enforcement has been much less unified).
10. Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 540–41
n.11 (2011) (“The securities regulatory regime seeks to prevent and punish fraud via
numerous provisions in both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act.
However, the most far-reaching of these provisions is Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, and its accompanying Rule 10b-5 . . . .”). While Congress explicitly provided for
a private cause of action under Sections 9 and 18 of the Exchange Act, they failed to do
so under Section 10(b). However, courts have taken the position “that a right to be free
from fraud implie[s] a remedy to make that right effective.” STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C.
PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: THE ESSENTIALS 107–08 (Vicki Been et al. eds.,
2008).
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broad language of both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was written to
“close[] a loophole in the protections against fraud.”11 Thus, courts
determined that Congress meant for Section 10(b) to protect
investors regardless of whether they purchased or sold securities on
U.S. markets.12 To determine if there was a sufficient jurisdictional
nexus between the conduct abroad and the investors Congress
intended to protect, courts applied the “conduct” and “effects” tests.13
The “effects” test states that the United States has jurisdiction over
claims arising out of fraudulent extraterritorial conduct that caused
losses within the United States or harmed U.S. markets.14
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook first articulated this test in 1968.15 The
case involved the sale of treasury shares of a Canadian corporation,
Banff Oil, Ltd., at a market price Banff and its directors knew would
undervalue the shares.16 The plaintiff was an American citizen and
Banff common stock was traded on both the American Stock
Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange.17 Although the
fraudulent transaction occurred in Canada, the court found that since
Banff was listed on a U.S. stock exchange, it was required to comply
with certain U.S. securities laws.18 In particular, the court held that
Section 10(b) had an extraterritorial reach if such fraudulent actions
had a detrimental effect on U.S. investors.19
The “conduct” test looks to the actions taken by the allegedly
fraudulent parties.20 If such actions occurred within the United
States, directly caused harm to investors, and were material to the
alleged fraud, then U.S. courts had jurisdiction—regardless of
whether the investors were U.S. citizens or whether the securities
were bought or sold within the United States.21 Judge Henry

11. Exchange Act Release No. 34-3230, 1942 WL 34443 (May 21, 1942).
12. Beyea, supra note 10, at 541 (citing Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.

Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (2d Cir. 1972)).
13. Id. at 542; Buxbaum, supra note 9, at 161.
14. Beyea, supra note 10, at 542; Buxbaum, supra note 9, at 161.
15. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968); see Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879; Beyea, supra note 10, at 542.
16. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 204.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 206.
19. Id.
20. See Beyea, supra note 10, at 543–44.
21. See id.
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Friendly first laid out the test in the 1972 case Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell.22
In Leasco, the plaintiffs, both U.S. and U.K. citizens, alleged that
U.K. defendants fraudulently induced them to buy U.K. corporate
stock at inflated prices.23 Looking to Section 17 of the Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States,24 the court held that
Section 10(b) could apply outside the United States so long as there
was “significant conduct” related to the fraud.25
Judge Friendly further refined these two tests in Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc.26 As to the “conduct” test, Judge Friendly asserted
that losses from securities sales to foreigners outside the United
States would only fall under the jurisdiction of U.S. securities laws
when the parties’ conduct directly caused such losses.27 However,
losses occurring to Americans abroad would not have to meet such a
high standard. Instead, such losses would fall under U.S. jurisdiction
if the acts or omissions that occurred within the United States were
of material importance.28 For the “effects” test, Judge Friendly
limited the test’s scope to those actions that would injure “purchasers
or sellers” of securities in whom the United States had an interest,
excluding actions that had a general detrimental effect on the
economy or U.S. investors.29
Until the Supreme Court overturned decades of precedent,30 courts
generally applied the principles found within the Restatement of

22. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
23. Id. at 1330.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

17 (1965) (“A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law . . . relating to a thing
located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory.”).
25. Conduct within the United States alone can be sufficient to allow a U.S. law to
be applied extraterritorially, but courts need to interpret each statute to see if it is meant
to be applied extraterritorially. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, for
example, explicitly applies to both foreign and domestic issuers and therefore can be
applied extraterritorially. Since Section 10(b) was modeled after Section 17(a), it too
can be applied extraterritorially so long as sufficient conduct occurs within the United
States. See Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334–35.
26. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
27. See id. at 993.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 989; see Richard B. Earls, Note, Extraterritorial Application of Fraud
Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1215, 1222 n.51
(1984) (noting that the court held that a general deterioration of investor confidence
resulting in a decline in securities prices is insufficient to trigger the “effects” test).
30. See supra notes 3 & 7 and accompanying text.
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Foreign Relations Law to extraterritorial regulatory law.31
Jurisdiction was based either on “conduct, that, wholly or in
substantial part, takes place within its territory [the ‘conduct’ test]
and conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory [the ‘effects’ test].”32 While
both of these tests mention the sale and purchase of securities, there
was no need for courts to determine exactly where a purchase or sale
of securities occurred.33 Instead, courts focused on the parties, their
actions, and the effects they had on either U.S. investors or U.S.
markets. The broad scope of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 allowed
courts to assume congressional intent as to the extraterritorial reach
of antifraud U.S. securities laws34 and sidestep the issue of where a
security was purchased or sold.35
II. THE LANGUAGE OF MORRISON AND WHAT “PURCHASE” OR
“SALE” MEANS UNDER THE “TRANSACTIONAL TEST”

As an “F-cubed” case (foreign petitioners filing suit against
foreign respondents over stocks sold on a foreign exchange),
Morrison was the first Supreme Court case to address the

31. Genevieve Beyea, Transnational Securities Fraud and the Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Securities Laws: Challenges and Opportunities, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L.
REV. 139, 145 (2011); see SEC, STUDY ON THE CROSS-BORDER SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE
RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
59 n.218 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-crossborder-private-rights.pdf [hereinafter Cross-Border Private Rights Study] (“The
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law is one of the leading secondary authorities on
international and foreign-relations law, and is also generally viewed as a persuasive
authority on questions of international comity such as those implicated by the potential
extraterritorial extension of a Section 10(b) private cause of action.”).
32. Beyea, supra note 31, at 145–46.
33. Compare Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 210 (2d Cir. 1968)
(explaining that a foreign purchase or sale of securities is sufficient to trigger the
“effects” test, and therefore Section 10(b) has extraterritorial reach), with Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336–37 (2d Cir. 1972)
(explaining that because Section 10(b) was intended to protect against fraudulent
conduct in the purchase or sale of securities, it had extraterritorial reach so long as a
sufficient amount of the fraudulent conduct occurred within the United States).
34. See supra notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text.
35. This is not to say that the “conduct” and “effects” tests were reliable tests in the
U.S. judicial system. They often yielded fairly unpredictable results and the Second
Circuit often did not give guidance as to what factors were determinative. See
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879–80 (2010); Beyea, supra
note 31, at 148; Joshua L. Boehm, Comment, Private Securities Fraud Litigation after
Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Reconsidering a Reliance-Based Approach to
Extraterritoriality, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, 254–55 (2012); Buxbaum, supra note 9, at
161–62.
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extraterritorial reach of U.S. antifraud securities claims.36 Petitioners
were Australian nationals who had purchased common stock shares
of respondent’s Australian company, National Australia Bank, Ltd.
(“National”), on the Australian Stock Exchange and other foreign
stock exchanges.37 HomeSide Lending, Inc., a Florida-based
mortgage servicing company, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of
National.38 With National’s knowledge, HomeSide manipulated its
financial models to make it appear to be more profitable than it
actually was.39 National then included the company’s inflated value
in National’s annual reports from 1998 through 2001 and touted its
success.40 In 2001, after National announced several write-downs
related to the Florida-based company that amounted to over two
billion dollars in losses, petitioners filed suit.41 The district court
dismissed petitioners’ claims stating that they failed to provide
sufficient evidence to create a jurisdictional nexus within the United
States under either the “conduct” or “effects” tests.42 A panel of five
judges affirmed the holding on appeal.43
While the Supreme Court could have affirmed the lower courts’
decisions, Justice Scalia instead decided to do away with both the
“conduct” and “effects” tests. First, he pointed to the longstanding
presumption against extraterritoriality in statutory law unless the
language explicitly provided for one.44 Then, after examining the
history and application of the “conduct” and “effects” tests, the Court
held that such tests were “judicial-speculation-made-law” and thus
lead to incongruous results.45 This analysis lead to Morrison’s main
holding: Section 10(b) only applies to “transactions in securities
listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other
securities.”46 The newly dubbed “transactional test” focuses on the

36. Beyea, supra note 10, at 550.
37. In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Secs. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL

3844465, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006).
38. Id.
39. Id. at *1–2.
40. See id. at *2.
41. Id.
42. See id. at *8 (“[I]t is the foreign acts—not any domestic ones—that ‘directly
caused’ the alleged harm here.”).
43. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2008).
44. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd.,130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
45. Id. at 2881.
46. Id. at 2884.

160

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 2:1

strict textual reading of Section 10(b), creating a bright-line rule
centered solely on where the purchase or sale occurred.
While the terms “purchase” and “sale” are contained within
Section 10(b),47 as well as defined within the Exchange Act,48 the
term “transaction” is not. Throughout the opinion, Justice Scalia
refers to the application of Section 10(b) using the words “purchase,”
“sale,” and “transaction” but only uses all three terms together in a
single sentence once.49 While Justice Breyer’s concurrence is more
explicit in equating a “transaction” to a “purchase” and “sale” of
securities,50 Justice Stevens’s concurrence never mentions those
terms together in a single sentence.51
One could take such rhetoric to mean that the Supreme Court
meant to equate “purchase” and “sale” as a “transaction” in its test,
but such a reading could force the test to be applied too expansively
or too narrowly.52 Under the Exchange Act, a “purchase” is defined
as “any contract to buy,” and a “sale” as “any contract to dispose
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “transaction” as the
of.”53
“discharge of a contract.”54
Therefore, depending on which
definition a court looks to, a transaction could either be held to be the
solicitation, formation, and execution of purchase and sale contracts
or solely the discharge of such contracts. Finally, since Section
10(b) reads “purchase or sale,” rather than “purchase and sale,” one
can infer that the statute recognizes temporal and geographic
differences between when and where a security is sold and bought,
unlike the term “transaction,” which makes no such distinction.55
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
48. Id. § 78c(a)(13)–(14).
49. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886 (“The transactional test we have adopted—

whether the purchase or sale is made in the United States, or involves a security listed
on a domestic exchange—meets that requirement.”).
50. Id. at 2888 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (“Section 10(b) of the [Exchange
Act] applies to fraud ‘in connection with’ two categories of transactions: (1) ‘the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange’ or (2) ‘the
purchase or sale of . . . any security not so registered.’”).
51. Id. at 2888–95 (Stevens, J., concurring).
52. See 2 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 8:36, 8-235 (2d ed. 2012).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13)–(14).
54. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1635 (9th ed. 2009).
55. See 2 NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 52, § 8:36, at 8-235 to 8-236 (“There is
only one reasonable conclusion consistent with Morrison. If either the offer to
purchase or the acceptance of the sale offer occurred in the United States, or, if either
the offer to sell or the acceptance of the purchase offer occurred in the United States,
then section 10(b) applies.”). But see id. § 8:36, at 8-236 (“The argument could be
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While the transactional test attempted to simplify the
determination of whether U.S. securities laws have an extraterritorial
reach, it created its own ambiguity in terms of where a “sale” or
“purchase” of securities occurs. Part of this ambiguity is due to the
language Justice Scalia used in Morrison to describe the
transactional test.56 In stating that Section 10(b) only applies to
domestically listed securities and domestic transactions in other
securities,57 the Court left open questions on how to interpret
transactional elements in an extraterritorial context.58 For example:
Does the purchase occur where the order is placed or where the
security was offered? Or neither? Does the transaction occur where
the security was cleared?59 Does either party have to be an American
citizen in order to gain protection under Section 10(b) for a securities
transaction not listed on a U.S. exchange? As this Article discusses
below, different courts have interpreted Morrison in varying, and
sometimes contradictory, ways.
III. HOW COURTS HAVE DETERMINED WHEN AND WHERE A
“PURCHASE” OR “SALE” HAS OCCURRED POST-MORRISON

In being forced to give up the “conduct” and “effects” tests, courts
have had to apply an entirely different rubric when analyzing the
jurisdictional requirements of an international antifraud case. The
transactional test the Supreme Court created in Morrison applies in
one of two situations: transactions for securities listed on a domestic
exchange or transactions for securities not listed on an exchange but
that are domestic.60 While the test easily applies to f-cubed

made that what the statute means is that the [Exchange Act] only applies to securities
traded on U.S. exchanges, and securities that are not traded on any national . . .
exchange so long as the purchase or sale occurs in the United States.”).
56. See id. § 8:33, at 8-207 to 8-209 (pointing to three separate mentions of
Morrison’s “transactional test” which could each presumably be interpreted
differently).
57. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
58. By focusing on what Section 10(b) does not say and not clarifying what it does
say, Morrison only definitively states that an “f-cubed” case does not have
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Terms like “purchase,” “sale,” “transaction,” and “settles”
have multiple interpretations which will force courts to make a decision on what Justice
Scalia meant in his transactional test. See 2 NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 52, § 8:36,
at 8-223.
59. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1554 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “stock clearing” as
“the actual exchange of money and stock between buyer and seller . . . .”).
60. See Beyea, supra note 10, at 562; Boehm, supra note 35, at 263; Buxbaum,
supra note 9, at 162.
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transactions, the complex nature of international financial
instruments in the global marketplace makes it difficult to uniformly
apply the transactional test to other instances.61 In noting the
disparity between courts in interpreting the two prongs of Morrison,
it is clear that having a strict, textual-based reading of a law can lead
to, at best, abnormal and, at worst, unjust results.62
A. Applying Morrison to Securities Listed on Domestic Exchanges

The first prong under the Morrison transactional test seems
deceptively easy to parse. A “transaction[] in securities listed on [a]
domestic exchange[]”63 is a domestic transaction and thus a purchase
or sale of securities within the United States. However, the global
nature of the securities marketplace makes this phrase somewhat less
than clear. Companies can have shares cross-listed on both a foreign
exchange and an American exchange. While courts have rejected the
idea that shares purchased on a foreign exchange are a domestic
transaction because they are cross-listed, a strict textual reading of
Morrison implies that such transactions are domestic.64
American Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”)65 also complicate a
court’s interpretation of whether a purchase or sale traded on an
exchange is domestic or not. Most international companies trade
their shares on U.S. exchanges as ADRs.66 Each ADR can represent
61. See Buxbaum, supra note 9, at 173.
62. See, e.g., Boehm, supra note 35, at 262–63 (explaining that a large number of

cases that courts have struggled to answer consistently due to the circumstancedependent questions present in complex securities transactions); Buxbaum, supra note
9, at 164–73 (comparing how courts have interpreted transactions of securities listed on
domestic exchanges, foreign exchanges, and transactions of American Depositary
Receipts as well as comparing how courts have interpreted various over the counter
securities transactions).
63. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
64. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 530 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (noting that all courts interpreting Morrison have rejected the idea that
transactions that involve securities listed but not traded on a domestic exchange are
domestic transactions. “Read in this context, perhaps Justice Scalia simply made a
mistake. He stated the test as being whether the alleged fraud concerned the purchase
or sale of a security ‘listed on an American stock exchange,’ . . . when he really meant
to say a security ‘listed and traded’ on a domestic exchange.”) (quoting Morrison, 130
S. Ct. at 2888).
65. See generally Cross-Border Private Rights Study, supra note 31, at A1–A4
(giving an in-depth description of how ADRs are created and the ADR market in the
United States).
66. International Investing, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last modified Aug. 14,
2012), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/ininvest.htm [hereinafter International
Investing].
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a single share, multiple shares, or a fraction of a share of an
international company’s stock.67 While the ADR corresponds to the
price of the foreign stock on its home market, trades of ADRs clear
and settle in U.S. dollars.68 A depositary bank, which issues the
ADRs, generally sends the ADR owner any dividends or cash
payments in U.S. dollars and arranges to vote the owner’s shares as
per the owner’s instructions.69 Additionally, ADRs cannot be issued
within the United States unless they are subject to the periodic
reporting requirements under the Exchange Act70 or are exempt from
these reporting requirements under Rule 12g3-2(b).71 Finally,
possession of an ADR gives an owner the right to obtain the foreign
stock if the owner so chooses.72 It has been difficult for courts to
decide whether purchasing an ADR on a U.S. exchange is a domestic
transaction or merely a proxy for a foreign purchase. Since ADRs
are purchased and sold on a U.S. exchange, one could argue that they
meet the transactional test requirement. But since they are a contract
for purchasing foreign securities listed on a foreign market, one
could also argue that, under Morrison, ADRs fall outside the
jurisdiction of U.S. antifraud securities law.
1. Purchases and Sales on Foreign Exchanges

One of the first cases to deal with deciding whether purchasing
shares on foreign exchanges is a domestic transaction is Stackhouse
v. Toyota Motor Co.73 Stackhouse was a class action suit which
arose over intentional misstatements by Toyota about the safety of
eight of its vehicles.74 Between 2004 and 2010, Toyota, which was
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”), claimed that numerous accidents involving

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. (“The depositary bank will convert any dividends or other cash

payments into U.S. dollars before sending them to you.”).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2010).
71. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (2010). See generally HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA
GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 115
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 18th ed. 2011) (explaining the registration and reporting
requirements under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934).
72. See International Investing, supra note 66.
73. No. 10-0922, 2010 WL 3377409 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010).
74. Complaint at *1–5, Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 10-0922, 2010 WL
562034 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
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unintended acceleration were due to driver error or faulty
placemats.75 When Toyota finally revealed that it had known about
the problem and issued a massive recall, its stock price fell sharply.76
The plaintiffs in the class action were U.S. citizens “who purchased
or otherwise acquired . . . securities of [Toyota], including [ADRs77
traded on the NYSE].”78 In determining who should be the lead
plaintiffs in the class action suit, Judge Fischer dismissed the idea
that buying or selling securities listed on a foreign exchange while
residing in the United States constituted a domestic transaction.79
Instead, Judge Fischer reasoned that purchasing or selling a security
on a foreign exchange was akin to going to the exchange and
completing the transaction through a foreign broker.80 Domestic
transactions, therefore, only occurred when the purchases and sales
were explicitly solicited by the issuer within the United States.81
Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group narrowed the definition of a
domestic transaction from Stackhouse by rejecting all activity on a
foreign exchange.82 Plaintiffs were parties who had either bought
Credit Suisse Group shares on the Swiss Stock Exchange or ADRs83
on the NYSE.84 Credit Suisse Group had allegedly made material
misrepresentations or omissions about its risk practices and its stock
price fell sharply due to the U.S. housing market crash.85 The group
that purchased shares on the Swiss Stock Exchange argued that the
terms “purchase” and “sale” should be interpreted within the context
of the choice of law provisions in the Restatement (First) of Conflict
of Laws.86 Judge Marrero rejected these arguments as merely trying
75. Id. at *2–4.
76. Id. at *3–5.
77. The case actually discusses purchases of American Depositary Shares

(“ADSs”). ADRs and ADSs are basically synonymous. International Investing, supra
note 66 (“An ADR is actually the negotiable physical certificate that evidences
ADSs, . . . and an ADS is the security that represents an ownership interest in the
[foreign security].”).
78. Complaint, supra note 74, at *7.
79. Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. 10-0922, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. July 16, 2010).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 625–26 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
83. See supra note 77.
84. Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
85. Id. at 622.
86. See id. (reasoning that since the parties made the investment decision in the
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to reinstate the “effects” test into the transactional test.87 Instead, he
looked to the corollary of the transactional test and held that trades
executed on foreign exchange markets are never truly domestic
transactions, even if some aspect of the transaction occurs within the
United States.88 Therefore, any transaction that occurs on a foreign
exchange would be considered a purchase or sale that occurred
outside the United States.
2. Purchases and Sales of Cross Listed Securities

Sgalambo v. McKenzie89 and In re Alstom SA Securities
Litigation90 examined purchases and sales of securities on foreign
exchanges when the shares were listed and sold on both domestic
and foreign exchanges, rather than through ADRs. Both cases were
class action suits brought against Canadian and French corporations,
respectively, for material misstatements which violated Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act.91 Each company was listed on an American
exchange as well as a foreign exchange, but the plaintiffs purchased
their shares off the foreign exchange.92 While the parties in
Sgalambo conceded that their purchases of securities were not made
within the United States, and therefore did not meet the transactional
test,93 the plaintiffs in Alstom argued that because the purchases
could have easily been made on the domestic exchange, they should
be considered domestic purchases.94 Further, the plaintiffs argued
that their purchases of securities on a foreign exchange were
“domestic” under Morrison, since those securities’ ADRs were listed

United States, accepted the shares into its U.S. account, and incurred the risks within
the United States, it was a domestic transaction).
87. Id. at 625 (“This Court is not convinced that the Supreme Court designed
Morrison to be squeezed, as in spandex, only into the factual strait jacket of its
holding.”).
88. See id. at 623–26 (finding that even if foreign transactions include American
investors or if portions of the transaction occur within the United States, the exception
pursued by the plaintiffs would not comply with the new rule due to the rare occasion
that foreign transactions lack any connectivity to the United States).
89. 739 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
90. 741 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
91. Id. at 471; Sgalambo, 739 F. Supp. 2d at 463–68.
92. See In re Alstom, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 471 (noting that the corporation was listed
on the French Stock Exchange); Sgalambo, 739 F. Supp. 2d at 487 (noting that the
corporation was listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange).
93. Sgalambo, 739 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
94. In re Alstom, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 471–72.

166

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 2:1

on a U.S. exchange.95 Judge Marrero, using Cornwell, held that
purchases and sales on a foreign exchange cannot be considered
domestic transactions and that, despite the wording in Morrison
regarding listed securities, Section 10(b) focuses solely on purchases
and sales.96 Therefore, because the actual purchases and sales were
made on a foreign exchange, they could not be considered domestic
even though they were also listed on a domestic exchange.97
3. Purchases and Sales of ADRs

Courts have not yet come to a single consensus on how to classify
purchases and sales of ADRs.
Earlier court decisions like
Stackhouse and Cornwell assumed that since ADRs were securities
listed and traded on a domestic exchange, they would fall within the
scope of the transactional test.98 But later courts have instead tried to
analyze the economic realities behind what ADRs represent, making
it more difficult for companies to predict whether they will be held
liable for securities fraud under U.S. law.99
Judge Berman looked to the economic underpinnings of ADRs in
In re Société Générale Securities Litigation.100 Société Générale
involved a class action suit against French company Société
Générale by two sets of parties: those who had purchased securities
on the Euronext Paris Stock Exchange and those who had purchased
ADRs on the New York over-the-counter market.101 The court
quickly dismissed the parties who purchased shares on the Euronext
Paris Stock Exchange as well as the parties who had purchased
ADRs, even though they were purchased and traded on a domestic
market.102 The court concluded that ADR transactions were
“predominantly foreign securities transactions”103 since they
95. Id. at 472 (“[A] crucial paragraph of Morrison concludes that ‘it is in our view
only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges . . . to which § 10(b)
applies.’” (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010))).
96. Id. at 472–73.
97. Id.
98. Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. 10–0922, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1–2
(C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (holding that the largest ADR holder should represent the
class action securities fraud case under the Morrison decision).
99. See, e.g., In re Société Générale Secs. Litig. No. 08 Civ. 2495, 2010 WL
3910286, *6 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 29, 2010); SEC v. Compania Internacional Financiera
S.A., No. 11 Civ. 4904(DLC), 2011 WL 3251813, *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011).
100. No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at *5 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 29, 2010).
101. In re Société Générale, 2010 WL 3910286, at *1.
102. Id. at *5–7.
103. Id. at *6 (quoting Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506 (S.D.N.Y.
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represent foreign shares of stock and are “traded in a less formal
market with lower exposure to U.S.-resident buyers.”104 Thus, under
Société Générale, purchases and sales of ADRs—even in a domestic
market between American investors—are foreign purchases and
sales, due to what they represent.
The economic analysis of ADRs and their financial equivalents,
however, can cut both ways in international securities law. The
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
successfully argued that shares sold on the London Stock Exchange
were domestic purchases and sales in SEC v. Compania
Internacional Financiera S.A.105 The case involved a Swiss
company acquiring an American company for twelve percent above
its listed price on the NYSE.106 A money manager based in Geneva,
using inside information, purchased contracts-for-difference
(“CFDs”)107 on the London Stock Exchange, which mirrored the
American company’s stock.108 When the SEC filed an action against
the defendants, freezing their assets, the money manager claimed that
his purchase of CFDs was outside U.S. jurisdiction since it occurred
entirely on the London Stock Exchange.109 The court, however, held
that Morrison dealt specifically with fraudulent activity in
connection with domestic purchases and sales of securities.110 Since
the central issue in this case was insider trading of domestic
securities listed on the NYSE, the defendants’ purchases of CDFs
constituted a domestic transaction under Morrison.111 Further, the
court argued that such a narrow reading of Morrison would protect
2010)).
104. Id.
105. No. 11 Civ. 4904(DLC), 2011 WL 3251813, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011).
106. Id. at *1.
107. A CFD is a contract whose purpose is to match “the price movements of
individual shares or bonds, stock market indices, or futures contracts.” For each day
that the contract is open, the purchaser will either pay or receive payment based on the
movement of the stock or bond on which the CFD is based. CFM13130 Understanding Corporate Finance: Derivative Contracts: Types Of Derivative: Limits
To
The
Regulatory
Definitions,
HM
REVENUE
&
CUSTOMS,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/cfmmanual/cfm13130.htm (last visited Aug. 5,
2012). As an ADR allows a U.S. investor to purchase the rights to foreign stocks
without purchasing them on a foreign market via a foreign brokerage account, a CDF
allows foreign investors to purchase U.S. securities without opening a U.S. brokerage
account. Compania, 2011 WL 3251813, at *3.
108. Compania, 2011 WL 3251813, at *2–3.
109. Id. at *5.
110. Id. at *6.
111. Id.
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individuals involved in complex securities frauds via the
transactional test so long as they personally did not trade in
securities, contrary to the Morrison court’s intent.112
But not all judges view the economic realities of ADRs in the
same light. In the cases of In re Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC
Securities Litigation113 and In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities
Litigation,114 Judges Batts and Holwell, respectively, each held that
purchases and sales of ADRs could be considered domestic
transactions.115 Each case involved class action suits where the
defendant companies sold securities on a foreign exchange and
ADRs on the NYSE.116 Unlike the court in Société Générale, the
courts did not similarly dismiss the claims of parties holding ADRs.
In Royal Bank of Scotland, defendants admitted that the purchase
and sale of ADRs would be considered a domestic transaction under
Morrison.117 Because the plaintiffs had not actually purchased any
ADRs, Judge Batts dismissed the Section 10(b) claims, but hinted
that purchasers of ADRs would have had standing.118
In contrast, Judge Holwell gave a detailed description of how
ADRs are purchased and sold. First, the court pointed out that when
a foreign issuer decides to issue ADRs within the United States, it
subjects itself to SEC reporting requirements and, therefore, may
create a nexus within the United States sufficient to constitute a
domestic purchase and sale.119 Judge Holwell then noted that
registering with the SEC and being listed on an exchange are not one
and the same.120 While all shares of a company would be registered
with the SEC, only those backing up the ADRs would be listed on a

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at *7.
765 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Royal Bank of Scot., 765 F. Supp. 2d at 337–38; In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d

at 529.
116. See In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 521; Royal Bank of Scot., 765 F. Supp. 2d
at 329–31.
117. Royal Bank of Scot., 765 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
118. Id. at 337–38 (“[C]ase law supports dismissal on these ADR claims where
Plaintiffs are not purchasers. . . . Lead Plaintiffs . . . do not have standing to bring
domestic ADR claims . . . .”) (emphasis added).
119. In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (noting that the nexus created may be
enough to subject a company to the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act).
120. Id. (looking at a sample NYSE listing application, the court noted that only the
number of ordinary shares needed to back up the amount of ADRs were listed and not
all shares of the company).
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U.S. exchange.121 Since not every common share backs up a
domestically listed ADR, one cannot simply argue that ownership of
a foreign common share gives someone U.S. jurisdiction under
Morrison. However, by owning an ADR, one would own a share
that was listed and traded on the NYSE, and therefore would be
within Morrison’s purview, meaning that a purchase or sale of an
ADR could be considered a domestic transaction.122
While courts have solidified around the concept that purchases on
foreign exchanges fail the Morrison transactional test and therefore
fall outside U.S. jurisdiction,123 they have not yet coalesced around
whether purchases and sales of ADRs are domestic transactions.
Société Générale, on one hand, holds that all purchases and sales of
ADRs, regardless of where they are bought and sold, are
international transactions and therefore fail Morrison’s transactional
test.124 Alternatively, Royal Bank of Scotland and Vivendi each state
that ADRs can be considered a domestic purchase so long as they
were bought and sold on a domestic exchange.125 Such holdings are
troubling to both domestic investors and foreign companies.
Investors cannot be sure whether they will be protected by U.S.
securities laws and foreign companies do not know if they will be
held liable for their actions outside the United States, contravening
the purpose for creating Morrison’s transactional test.126
B. Applying Morrison to Securities Not Listed on an Exchange

When a purchase or sale of a security is not listed on a domestic
exchange—also known as an over-the-counter (“OTC”) transaction

121. Id.
122. See id. (“The ADRs were both listed and traded on the NYSE, and thereby fall

within any reading of Morrison.”).
123. See, e.g., Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. 10–0922, 2010 WL 3377409, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620,
623–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Alstom SA Secs. Litig., 741 F. Supp.2d 469, 472–73
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Sgalambo v. McKenzie, 739 F. Supp. 2d 453, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
124. See In re Société Générale Secs. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495, 2010 WL 3910286,
at *5–7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010).
125. See Royal Bank of Scot., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating
so implicitly); In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
126. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2885–86 (2010)
(“[Various foreign nations] complain of the interference with foreign securities
regulation that application of § 10(b) abroad would produce, and urge the adoption of a
clear test that will avoid that consequence. The transactional test we have adopted—
whether the purchase or sale is made in the United States, or involves a security listed
on a domestic exchange—meets that requirement.”).
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—courts have had to look more at the actions taken by parties to
determine whether a domestic purchase or sale has occurred. An
OTC transaction of a security has many elements, including the
citizenship of the parties, the solicitation, the offer, the decision to
invest, and the transferring of title for the instrument.127 Courts have
had to determine at what point in the process the transaction occurred
and which of these factors were merely conduct and thus separate
from the transaction. So far, courts have developed three main
methods to determine whether a purchase or sale is domestic: the
economic realities method, the irrevocable liability method, and the
transfer of title method.128 Unfortunately, each method can result in
a different outcome for a purchaser or seller, making it difficult for
courts to give proper guidance to issuers and investors.
1. The Economic Realities Method

As financial instruments become increasingly complex, courts
have had to examine transactions where the purchases or sales of
securities are based on pools of other securities and assets129 or pools
of asset-backed securities.130 For example, if one were to invest in a
foreign hedge fund, which, in turn, invested in domestic securities,
would the purchase be a domestic transaction under Morrison? In
these instances, the courts look at the “economic realities” of the
transaction to determine whether the purchase of a complex security
falls under Morrison’s transactional test.
In re Banco Santander Securities-Optimal Litigation131 was one of
the first cases to deal with an OTC transaction. The case dealt with
multiple foreign entities that had invested in several Bahamian
investment funds.132 These funds had, in turn, invested in funds run
by Bernard L. Madoff’s firm.133 Plaintiffs claimed that the
defendants, financial services institutions managing the Bahamian
funds, failed to perform adequate due diligence on the Madoff-run
127. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 9, at 167–68 (noting the various ways plaintiffs
have, post-Morrison, pointed to a variety of factors to prove that a transaction has
occurred within the United States).
128. See infra Part IV.B.1–3.
129. See generally SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 71, at 967–1030 (describing how
mutual and hedge funds are formed and regulated).
130. See generally id. at 704–33 (describing how pools of assets are securitized,
structured, and sold).
131. 732 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
132. Id. at 1311.
133. Id.
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funds and, therefore, asserted securities fraud claims under Rule 10b5 when the funds became worthless after Madoff’s Ponzi scheme
came to light.134 Plaintiffs argued that the Bahamian funds were
purchased for the purpose of ultimately investing in U.S. funds
through Madoff’s firm.135 Thus, plaintiffs claimed that their
purchase was “in connection with” Madoff’s investment funds and
therefore a domestic transaction.136 Judge Huck dismissed these
arguments by holding that the phrase “in connection with” refers to
the fraud alleged and not the actual purchase or sale of securities.137
Even though the hedge fund was composed of domestic securities,
the economic reality was that the securities were purchased in offshore Bahamian investment fund.138 Therefore, plaintiffs’ fraud
claims did not meet Morrison’s transactional test because the
securities were purchased outside the United States and therefore
governed by the laws of the Bahamas.139
Conversely, the court in SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd. held that
fraudulent activity outside the United States can fall within the scope
of Morrison’s transactional test if the activity is in connection with
purchases and sales of securities in the United States and is listed on
a U.S. exchange.140 The case involved defendant Credit Bancorp, a
company based in Geneva, and Thomas Rittweger, an American
citizen who was Credit Bancorp’s managing director for North
America.141 Defendants solicited individuals to invest in its “Insured
Credit Facility Program.”142 Using various assets as collateral,
investors could borrow money at substantially lower rates than
competing brokerage houses.143 The assets would then earn interest
and be paid back to the investors as a form of “dividend.”144 Despite
promises to the contrary, defendants took the collateral assets and
margined or sold them outright to fund a variety of different business

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. at 1315–16.
Id. at 1317.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
738 F. Supp. 2d 376, 396–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 380; see Complaint in Intervention at *1, SEC v. Credit Bancorp Ltd.,
738 F. Supp. 2d 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 99 Civ. 11395), 2003 WL 23671599, at *1.
142. Credit Bancorp., F. Supp. 2d at 380.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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investments and personal purchases within Europe.145 Rittweger
argued that since all the fraudulent activity had occurred in Europe,
his conduct did not fall within the scope of Morrison.146 Judge Sweet
held that since Rittweger solicited American investors and received
their stock certificates within the United States, his actions were a
domestic transaction.147 Rittweger also told domestic investors that
their assets—some of which were stocks listed on U.S. exchanges—
would be kept within the United States, further bolstering the SEC’s
assertion that Rittweger’s fraudulent actions were in connection with
a domestic securities transaction.148 Therefore, despite the fraudulent
purchases occurring outside the United States, the economic reality
was that Rittweger’s domestic actions were sufficient enough to fall
under Morrison’s purview.
Interestingly, when the court in Elliott Associates v. Porsche
Automobil Holding SE149 applied the economic realities method to
domestic hedge funds invested in domestic securities, it held that
such transactions did not fall under Morrison’s transactional test. In
Elliott Associates, plaintiffs were a collection of thirty-five hedge
funds that were managed by nine investment managers in New
York.150 The funds entered into a security-based swap agreement
which they created and carried out entirely within the United States
to track the price of Volkswagen (“VW”) shares traded in
Germany.151 The swap agreement was inversely proportional to the
price of VW shares, so that if the price went up, the plaintiffs would
generate losses.152 The plaintiffs claimed that defendant, Porsche,
made misleading statements about its desire to buy VW shares.153
Later, when Porsche announced that it had accumulated a large
portion of VW shares, causing a sharp price increase, the plaintiffs
lost a considerable amount of money.154 Plaintiffs argued that, while
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 381.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 396–97.
Id. at 397 (“[T]he transactions for which Rittweger was prosecuted and sued
satisfied both approaches to the application of § 10(b) under Morrison: they involved a
securities transaction occurring domestically, and they involved the exchange of
securities listed on domestic exchanges.”).
149. 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
150. Id. at 471.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 473.
154. Id.
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Porsche’s actions were performed entirely outside of the United
States, the purchases and sales of the domestic swap agreement were
made entirely in the United States, falling within the scope of
Morrison.155 The court dismissed these arguments and instead
compared the swap agreement to the plaintiffs actually going to
Germany to purchase VW shares.156 Under the economic realities
method, the transactions were conducted on foreign exchanges and
thus did not meet the Morrison transactional test.157
The divergent opinions of Banco Santander, Credit Bancorp, and
Elliot Associates underlie the problems of applying the Morrison test
to OTC transactions, as each decision must be interpreted on a caseby-case basis. While Banco Santander held that a foreign hedge fund
invested with domestic securities did not meet the Morrison
transactional test using the economic realities method158 Credit
Bancorp held that a domestic securities fund that made fraudulent
foreign investments did.159 Elliott Associates held, surprisingly, that
domestic hedge funds invested in U.S. security swaps were not a
Such disparate applications of the
domestic transaction.160
transactional test can lead to market inefficiency because neither the
investors nor the managers of these securities have any certainty as
to whether they may fall under U.S. jurisdiction.161
2. The Irrevocable Liability Method

Some courts have tried to solve the problem of determining where
a “purchase” and “sale” occurs by first determining when it occurs.
Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance
Co.,162 SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co. (“Tourre”),163 and Basis Yield

155.
156.
157.
158.

Elliott, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
Id. at 476.
Id.
In re Banco Santander Secs.-Optimal Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317 (S.D.
Fla. 2010).
159. SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 738 F. Supp. 2d 376, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
160. Elliott, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
161. Cf. Cross-Border Private Rights Study, supra note 31, at v (noting that twentythree comment letters were written to the SEC arguing against enacting the Morrison
transactional test under the argument that, among other things, it would be more costly
for U.S. investment funds to trade on foreign securities as they may be forced to trade
ADRs or forego U.S. investor protection).
162. 735 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
163. 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.164 each focused
on the idea that “an individual [becomes] a ‘purchaser’ when he or
she [incurs] an irrevocable liability to take and pay for the stock.”165
The Plumbers’case involved a pension fund that purchased stocks
on the Swiss stock exchange from defendant’s company that
allegedly made fraudulent statements about its earnings and
accounting statements.166 Plaintiffs argued that the transaction
occurred within the United States because (1) they were a U.S.
entity, (2) they made the decision to invest within the United States,
(3) they placed their orders for stocks within the United States, (4)
they suffered harm in the United States, and (5) the traders who
executed plaintiffs’ orders were within the United States.167 Looking
at these five elements, Judge Koeltl held that none of them were
determinative in deciding whether a purchase was made within the
United States.168 The location of the purchaser at the time the order
was placed was not determinative because it would not necessarily
be the same place that the transaction was formed.169 Neither would
the location of the purchaser be determinative because whenever the
decision to invest was made or the damages were subsequently
incurred, the location of the actual transaction would change.170
Since the plaintiffs had failed to assert that their order was
irrevocable when it was placed and conceded that the purchase was
made on a foreign exchange, the purchase could not be considered
domestic under Morrison.171
Both Tourre and Basis involved defendants providing misleading
information when selling synthetic collateralized debt obligations
(“CDOs”)172 to a foreign party.173 Both courts, drawing heavily on
164. 798 F. Supp. 2d 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
165. Plumbers’ Union, 735 F. Supp. 2d at 177 (quoting Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d

426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954)).
166. Id. at 171–73.
167. Id. at 178.
168. Id. at 177–78; see id. at 178 (“There may be unique circumstances in which an
issuer’s conduct takes a sale or purchase outside this rule, but the mere act of
electronically transmitting a purchase order from within the United States is not such a
circumstance.”).
169. See id. at 178.
170. See id.
171. See id.; see also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2869
(2010).
172. See generally SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 71, at 717 (describing how CDOs
are created).
173. Basis, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 535–36; Tourre, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 150–54.
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the decision in Plumbers’, held that to prove that a purchase was
made within the United States, a plaintiff must show that the
defendants incurred “irrevocable liability.”174 In Tourre, Judge Jones
was somewhat unclear in her decision that, in order to prove a
domestic purchase, one has to prove that securities have to incur
irrevocable liability within the United States. In doing so, Judge
Jones seemingly combined the temporal aspect of when irrevocable
liability occurs with where irrevocable liability occurs.175 She
attempted to clear up this distinction in Basis by explaining that once
the plaintiff shows when a security has incurred irrevocable liability,
he or she can then prove where the security was purchased.176
However, she gave no indication as to what factors would allow a
court to draw a reasonable inference that the purchase or sale
occurred within the United States.
Judge Krieger cleared up some of the ambiguity left by Judge
Jones in Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Management
Holdings Ltd.177 In Cascade, Cayman Island investment fund
manager defendants solicited the plaintiff, a U.S. entity, to invest in
their funds, which were made up of unregulated U.S. “penny
stocks.”178 The plaintiff alleged that defendants had fraudulently
failed to disclose material facts, causing it to sustain losses on its
investments.179 In arguing that its purchase of defendants’ funds
occurred in the United States, the plaintiff used factors similar to the
plaintiffs in Plumbers’180 but also pointed out that “the money for the
174. Basis, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 537; Tourre, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 157–58.
175. Tourre, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 158–59 (looking at Plumbers’, Judge Jones held that

the notion of when “irrevocable liability” occurs is the core of both purchase and sale,
but then states that the SEC had failed to “demonstrate where any party to the
[securities] purchases incurred ‘irrevocable liability’”) (quoting Plumbers’, 753 F.
Supp. 2d at 177) (emphasis added).
176. Basis, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (“Consequently, courts dealing with securities not
traded on any exchange, like the CDO at issue here, have had to define when a
purchase or sale occurs so that it can then determine where the transaction took place.”)
(emphasis in original).
177. No. 08-CV-01381-MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 1211511 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011).
178. Cascade, 2011 WL 1211511, at *1; see Important Information on Penny
Stocks, U.S. S EC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/schedule15g.htm
(last visited Aug. 23, 2012) (“Penny stocks are low-priced shares of small
companies.”).
179. Cascade, 2011 WL 1211511, at *1.
180. Id. at *7 (“Cascade points to four facts . . . : (i) the Offering Memoranda and
other investment materials were disseminated to [the plaintiff] in the United States; (ii)
[the defendants] traveled to the United States to solicit American investors; (iii)
[plaintiff] made its decision to invest while in the United States . . . .”).
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purchase was wired to a bank in New York.”181 After dismissing the
other factors as non-determinative under Morrison, the court stated
that the transaction did not have “irrevocable liability” at the moment
the money transferred but rather when the defendants accepted the
application to invest in the funds.182 Therefore, since the defendants
presumably accepted the application while in their Cayman Island
offices, the purchase did not occur within the United States and fell
outside the scope of Morrison’s transactional test.183
While courts have applied the irrevocable liability method
uniformly, there is still a lot of uncertainty as to how a potential
plaintiff may overcome the extraordinarily high burden the method
puts in place. In Plumbers’, Tourre, and Basis, the burden of proof
was on the plaintiff to prove that the transaction was irrevocably
liable.184 However, those courts failed to provide determinative
factors as to whether a transaction was irrevocably liable. They only
pointed to factors which were not determinative.185 Further,
Cascade—which utilized, but did not explicitly state it was using, the
irrevocable liability method—only made an allusion as to how
deciding when a transaction occurred would allow a court to
determine where a transaction occurred.186 But using this method
alone would create a simple loophole for fraudulent actors to merely
open a foreign office and make sure to accept applications to invest
funds in that office, leading to possibly unjust applications of the
Morrison transactional test.

181. Id.
182. See id. (stating that the transfer of money “simply describes a step . . . to

comply with [the] process for applying to invest in [defendant’s] funds . . . . [The
defendant] reserved the right to reject a request to invest for any reason, even if the
purchase money had properly been wired to New York”).
183. Id.
184. Plumbers’, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (“The plaintiffs’ construction would require
a fact-bound, case-by-case inquiry into when exactly an investor’s purchase order
became irrevocable.”); Basis, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (“[T]o state a claim under Section
10(b), a plaintiff must allege that the parties incurred irrevocable liability to purchase or
sell the security in the United States.”); Tourre, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (“[T]he
[plaintiff] bears the burden of alleging the [defendant’s securities] purchases were
domestic transactions . . . . The Court need not address the [plaintiff]’s argument in
view of the [plaintiff]’s failure to allege that any party to the [defendant’s securities]
purchases incurred ‘irrevocable liability’ in the United States.”).
185. Plumbers’, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178; Basis, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 537; Tourre, 790
F. Supp. 2d at 158.
186. See Cascade, 2011 WL 1211511, at *7.
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3. The Transfer of Title Method

The transfer of title method is a way for courts to deal with more
nuanced transactions without resorting to the confusing irrevocable
liability method or bending the law to meet the economic realities
method. For example, Quail Cruise Ship Mgmt., Ltd. v. Agencia De
Viagens CVC Tur Limitada involved a Bahamian corporation who
claimed that defendants, Brazilian and American entities,
fraudulently induced it into buying a faulty cruise ship via a stock
purchase from a Uruguayan corporation.187 The plaintiff argued that
the stock transfer was made pursuant to an agreement subject to
Florida law and that the documentation required to transfer the stock
was sent to Florida.188 Therefore, the plaintiff argued, the purchase
occurred within the United States since the parties intended the
closing to occur in the Miami law office of one of the parties’
counsel.189 The district court held that the intent of the parties to
close the sale is not dispositive of where a securities transaction
occurs.190 Instead, the location of the purchase or sale, not the
closing, is determinative of where the securities transaction
occurred.191 Since the share purchase agreement was signed in Spain
by Quail and in Uruguay by the Uruguayan corporation, the
transaction did not occur within the United States and thus failed the
Morrison transactional test.192
However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the district
court’s decision.193 The court noted that Quail alleged that the
transaction for the stock purchase closed by means of both parties
submitting the stock transfer documents to the Miami law office.194
In looking at the black letter definition of “closing” and “sale” in
Black’s Law Dictionary and the wording in the stock purchase
agreement, the court held that the title to the shares was transferred
to the plaintiff at the closing and that such a transfer constituted a

187. 732 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2010) vacated, 645 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.
2011).
188. Id. at 1349.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1350.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1349–50.
193. Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645
F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011).
194. Id. at 1309.
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domestic sale.195 Therefore, the plaintiff’s purchase fell within the
scope of Morrison’s transactional test since the transfer of title
signified that the transaction had been completed.196
The most recent case to be decided concerning Morrison’s
extraterritorial reach attempted to find harmony between the
irrevocable liability and the transfer of title methods. In Absolute
Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto,197 plaintiffs were nine
Cayman Islands hedge funds who, like the plaintiffs in Cascade,
were induced by defendants to purchase nearly valueless “penny
stocks” issued by companies within the United States.198 The
defendants then traded the stocks between the funds to artificially
increase the stocks’ prices.199 The district court employed the
transactional test by examining the market on which penny-stocks
are traded.200 Even though the trades were being performed by U.S.
companies, the funds were being traded solely among the Cayman
Island funds.201 Therefore, the district court held that the purchases
and sales were not domestic and failed the Morrison transactional
test.202
On appeal, Judge Katzmann drew from Plumbers’, Tourre, and
Quail to argue that a sale of securities can either be understood when
the purchaser incurred irrevocable liability or when the title is
transferred.203 In using both the irrevocable liability and transfer of
title methods, the court listed the following types of evidence that
may indicate a domestic transaction: “facts concerning the formation
of the contracts, the placement of purchase orders, the passing of
title, or the exchange of money.”204 However, since the plaintiffs had
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1310–11.
197. 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’g in part, rev’g in part and remanding Absolute

Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Homm, No. 09 CV 08862(GBD), 2010 WL
5415885 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010).
198. Id. at *62–63.
199. Id. at *63–64.
200. Homm, 2010 WL 5415885, at *5.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Ficeto, 677 F.3d at 68 (“Given that the point at which the parties become
irrevocably bound is used to determine the timing of a purchase and sale, we similarly
hold that the point of irrevocable liability can be used to determine the locus of a
securities purchase or sale. . . . However, we do not believe this is the only way to
locate a securities transaction . . . [A] sale of securities can be understood to take place
at the location in which title is transferred.”).
204. Id. at 70.
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failed to give sufficient proof, Judge Katzmann held that their claims
did not meet the transactional test of Morrison.205
The transfer of title method, therefore, allows for a more uniform
application of the transactional test by various courts. Instead of
arguing the economic realities of their securities transaction or
providing evidence that the transaction was irrevocably liable within
the United States, plaintiffs, like the ones in Quail, merely need to
show that the transfer of title occurred within the United States in
order to overcome the Morrison transactional test.206 Ficeto
encourages this view by stating that the transfer of title is a
determinative factor in deciding whether or not a transaction is
domestic.207 However, the same loophole that could be used to
circumvent the holding in Cascade is present here. Issuers could set
up an offshore office to close a securities transaction and therefore
avoid liability.
IV.

HOW COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET MORRISON GOING
FORWARD

Justice Scalia attempted in Morrison to replace the principlesbased method of determining the extraterritorial reach of antifraud
securities laws with a clear rules-based method. But with crosslisted securities being traded on a global scale and complex financial
instruments being created and passed between various multinational
institutions, strict, textual-based readings of a Morrison have created
incongruous holdings. While there is not much courts can do to
change the test, absent urging Congress or the Supreme Court to
modify it, there are ways in which courts should approach an
international antifraud case to minimize deviation between courts
holdings while still adhering to the “spirit” of Morrison.
Despite the possibilities of allowing an investor to be taken
advantage of by a fraudster on an international exchange, Cornwell’s
holding that all “purchases” and “sales” made on a foreign exchange
are outside the scope of Morrison should be adopted.208 This brightline rule would be easy and effective to manage by a court, and it
would leave little room for parties to argue that their transactions

205. Id.
206. Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645

F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011).
207. Ficeto, 677 F.3d at 70.
208. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 625–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

180

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 2:1

were domestic. Further, this rule would fall within the spirit of
Morrison of avoiding the possibility of “judicial-speculation-madelaw”209 as to whether a foreign investor solicited within the United
States. However, it should only apply to direct purchases and shares
on the foreign market, and it should not be extended to mutual or
hedge funds, which invest on a majority of different markets. Those
kinds of transactions should be viewed as OTC transactions and be
analyzed by the second Morrison prong rather than the first.
As for ADRs, courts should follow Judge Holwell’s reasoning in
Vivendi. Judge Holwell’s textual analysis, which differentiates
between being registered and being listed on an exchange, avoids
forcing the courts to walk the judicial line of determining whether or
not an ADR is a “predominantly foreign securities transaction”210 and
therefore falling outside Morrison. While one could use the Société
Générale method of assuming all ADRs are foreign transactions, it
goes against the textual reading of Morrison and the Exchange Act
since ADRs are specifically mentioned within the Act.211
To harmonize the holdings concerning OTC securities
transactions, courts should reject the economic realities method in
favor of the more succinct, but still flexible, combination of
irrevocable liability and transfer of title tests. As witnessed in Banco
Santander, Credit Bancorp, and Elliott, understanding the “economic
realities” can be an unwieldy test to administer and lead to entirely
opposite outcomes—the very same problems Justice Scalia tried to
avoid when creating the transactional test. Rather than determining
if a transaction was actually in another country or was merely akin to
being in another country, the temporal and financial determinations
laid out by the irrevocable liability and transfer of title tests allow for
the flexibility necessary to catch more complex securities litigation
while still being clear enough to administer uniformly. For example,
if a foreign hedge fund were to purchase domestic securities and then
defraud its investors, the economic realities test would require courts
to decide whether the transaction was domestic (i.e., the economic
reality is that the hedge fund investors essentially purchased the
domestic stocks themselves) or extraterritorial (i.e., the economic
209. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010).
210. In re Société Générale Secs. Litig. No. 08 Civ. 2495, 2010 WL 3910286, at *4

(S.D.N.Y Sept. 29, 2010) (citing Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp.
2d 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
211. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (2010).
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reality is that the investors purchased shares of a foreign hedge fund).
Different courts could come to different conclusions. Under the
combined irrevocable liability and transfer of title tests, the investors
would know that they would be protected under U.S. securities laws
so long as they could prove that the title to their shares of the hedge
fund passed to them within the United States. However, this method
alone has the potential to create legal loopholes. Foreign or domestic
entities could attempt to set up offshore offices for the sole purpose
of transferring title outside the United States while leading investors
to believe that the transfer occurred within the United States. In this
circumstance, the irrevocable liability test could close those
loopholes by pinpointing the time the transaction occurred and then
the location of the parties when the transaction occurred—thus
giving more flexibility to courts in interpreting complex financial
securities transactions while minimizing any incongruence between
varying court decisions.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Morrison v. National Australia
Bank represents an attempt to move away from principles-based
securities law analysis and towards a more rule-based assessment.
However, the Court failed to realize the reason courts came to adopt
such an analysis. Section 10(b)’s broad language allowed it to easily
adapt to today’s securities markets, despite the growth of crossborder securities transactions and increasingly complex financial
instruments. But by limiting Section 10(b) to a strict textual
analysis, courts have had to go back and analyze each term within
the legislation, causing confusion among investors and issuers as to
what rights they are afforded within the United States. As Justice
Stevens noted, “While the clarity and simplicity of the Court’s test
may have some salutary consequences, like all bright-line rules it
also has drawbacks.”212 In doing away with the “conduct” and
“effects” test, Justice Scalia inadvertently planted several new
judicial saplings, which the lower courts have had to tend without
much guidance. Hopefully, with a little pruning, they will grow
together and form the unified tree the Supreme Court envisioned.

212. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).

